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The Greeks have been publicly humiliated and 
their national sovereignty has been thrown to 
the wind, all for a financial plan which has no 
possible chance of success.
By Peter Lawrence and Michael Prior
Greece, the 
Eurozone and 
the Future of 
the EU
Europe is in a mess. The EU’s treatment of Greece’s deficit pitted the northern states with 
their deficit fetishism against the 
southern, who themselves were split 
over whether economic austerity was 
the right way to reduce the level of 
public debt resulting from the financial 
crisis. The failure of the EU to agree on 
how to deal with the refugee crisis – 
the influx of large numbers of people 
fleeing war zones – caused another 
split, this time pitting the newer eastern 
EU states against the others. The UK 
Conservative government’s decision 
to have a referendum on continued 
membership of the EU, not to mention 
the underlying crisis of economic 
stagnation, has added to the sense that 
Europe has lost its way. The Greek crisis 
raised the possibility of one country 
leaving the euro, bringing into question 
the future of the euro itself, and these 
subsequent developments threaten the 
very future of the EU.
In this article, we first pose the 
question of the future of the euro in the 
light of the deal between Greece and 
the EU, framed as it was by the tough 
stance, taken especially by Germany, 
on how to deal with Greece’s deficit. 
We then consider a second, much 
harder, and probably more serious, 
question: what will happen to 
the European Union not only as a 
consequence of how Greece has been 
treated, but also in the context of the 
wider crisis in which Europe finds itself?
The simplest way to address the first 
question is that Greece is not being 
rescued, but in fact being punished. 
The much-publicised document, 
encapsulated as the Second Bailout 
Agreement (SBA), is quite simply a 
takeover by the European Commission 
of the running of the Greek financial 
and economic system1 down to details 
such as how Greek pharmacies and 
bakeries should be registered. It is 
hard, probably impossible, to find 
an economist who believes that the 
harsh austerity programme imposed 
on Greece will resolve its economic 
difficulties. Even the economic advisers 
in the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) appear to have convinced 
Christine Lagarde, head of the IMF 
and hitherto a leader of the manacles 
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the Troika (the three institutions of the 
IMF, EU (Eurozone) and the European 
Central Bank) that Greek sovereign 
debt is unsustainable. As Lagarde put it 
in August this year:
I remain firmly of the view 
that Greece’s debt has become 
unsustainable and that Greece 
cannot restore debt sustainability 
solely through actions on its own. 
Thus, it is equally critical for medium 
and long-term debt sustainability 
that Greece’s European partners 
make concrete commitments in 
the context of the first review of the 
ESM (European Stability Mechanism) 
program to provide significant debt 
relief, well beyond what has been 
considered so far.
The IMF’s own charter forbids its 
lending to countries whose debts are 
unsustainable and, as a rule of thumb, 
a GDP/debt ratio of above 120% is 
seen as such. It is apparent that the IMF 
is very doubtful about Greece’s future 
unless a significant part of the current 
debt is written-off, something that the 
Germans in particular have been very 
resistant to allow. Greece has suffered 
very hard times since the financial 
crash of 2008. Some key statistics 
illustrate this:
• Greek GDP fell from €242 billion 
in 2008 to €179 billion in 2014, a 
26% decline overall. Greece was 
in recession for over five years 
although, by some measures, it 
emerged from it in 2014.
• GDP per capita fell from a peak 
of €22,500 in 2007 to €17,000 in 
2014, a 24% decline.
• The unemployment rate has risen 
considerably, from below 10% 
(2005-2009) to around 25% (2014-
2015). Youth unemployment is 
above 50%, so high that statistical 
measures have ceased to have 
much meaning.
• An estimated 44% of Greeks lived 
below the poverty line in 2014.
It is difficult to over-emphasise 
just how close Greece is to the edge. 
In 2015, the Venetis bakery chain 
in Athens was giving away 10,000 
loaves of bread a day, one-third of 
its total production. In some of the 
poorest neighbourhoods, according 
to the chain's general manager, there 
were disturbances among the large 
numbers of hungry people queueing 
up to receive bread, and he went on 
to say “In the third round of austerity 
measures, which is beginning now, 
it is certain that in Greece there will 
be no consumers – there will be only 
beggars."2
The underlying cause of the debt 
crisis is that following introduction of 
the euro in 2001, Greece, along with 
several other Eurozone countries, went 
on a massive debt-based expansion, 
both private and public. In Greece, 
one aspect of this was a boom in house 
buying with the result that it achieved 
the highest level of home-ownership, 
87%, in the EU, possibly in the world. 
House prices have plunged since 2008 
by perhaps 50% and there are few 
buyers. 
Another aspect of this debt 
expansion was expenditure by the 
Greek government, most notoriously 
on armaments. As Paul Haydon wrote 
in the UK’s Guardian newspaper in 
2012:
The fact that Greece, a relatively 
small and democratic country with 
not much in the way of global 
ambitions, should spend as much on 
its military as it does is perplexing. 
In 2006, as the financial crisis was 
looming, Greece was the third 
biggest arms importer after China 
and India. And over the past 10 
years its military budget has stood 
at an average of 4% of GDP, more 
than £900 per person. If Greece is 
in need of structural reform, then its 
oversized military would seem the 
most logical place to start. In fact, 
if it had only spent the EU average 
of 1.7% over the last 20 years, it 
would have saved a total of 52% of 
its GDP – meaning instead of being 
completely bankrupt it would be 
among the more typical countries 
struggling with the recession…
…One major factor is that France 
and Germany's arms industries have 
greatly profited from this profligate 
military spending, leading their 
governments to put pressure on 
Greece not to cancel lucrative arms 
deals. In the five years up to 2010, 
Greece purchased more of Germany's 
arms exports than any other country, 
buying 15% of its weapons. Over 
the same period, Greece was the 
third-largest customer for France's 
military exports and its top buyer 
in Europe. Significantly, when the 
first bail-out package was being 
negotiated in 2010, Greece spent 
7.1bn euros (£5.9bn) on its military, 
up from 6.24bn euros in 2007. A 
total of £1bn was spent on French 
and German weapons, plunging the 
country even further into debt in the 
same year that social spending was 
cut by 1.8bn euros. It is claimed by 
some that this was no coincidence, 
and that the EU bail-out was 
explicitly tied to burgeoning 
arms deals. In particular, there is 
alleged to have been concerted 
pressure from France to buy 
several stealth frigates. Meanwhile 
Germany sold 223 howitzers and 
completed a controversial deal on 
faulty submarines, leading to an 
investigation into accusations of 
bribes being given to Greek officials.3
In 2014, German armaments and 
car parts conglomerate, Rheinmetall, 
was fined €37 million after a subsidiary 
bribed Greek officials to buy a €150 
million air defence system. Earlier 
in the year, a former civil servant in 
charge of purchasing at the Greek 
defence ministry admitted pocketing 
€13 million over 20 years for backing 
about a dozen projects.  Antonios 
Kantas claimed to have received 
€1.5 million from Rheinmetall for 
green-lighting the purchase of the 
air-defence system and an upgrade 
of Greek submarine electronics. The 
German tank manufacturer, Krauss-
Maffei Wegmann, allegedly paid him 
€600,000 for supporting the purchase 
of 170 tanks at a cost of €1.7 billion. 
“In the third  
round of austerity 
measures, which is 
beginning now, it is 
certain that in Greece 
there will be no 
consumers – there  
will be only  
beggars."
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He received a similar amount, the 
official said, by backing the purchase 
of German submarines from the Kiel-
based company HDW. The submarines 
later proved defective.
There is no doubt that there is 
widespread corruption in the Greek 
government and in civil society 
in general and that tax evasion is 
extremely common. A form of legal 
tax evasion is practised by the Greek 
shipping industry, the largest in the 
world, which pays no tax on its 
international earnings, a practice 
enshrined in the Greek constitution. It 
is accepted that Greek entry into the 
Eurozone was based on false statistics 
as to its budgetary and fiscal situation, 
statistics compiled with the expert help 
of the Goldman-Sachs bank which 
knows a thing or two about concealing 
bad news.4 However, the Syriza 
government was elected on a firm 
promise to do something about such 
civic corruption and they have showed 
clear intent to follow through on this. In 
2013, a former defence minister, Akis 
Tsochatzopoulos, was given a 20-year 
sentence for corruption though his 
period in office was before entry into 
the euro. Although the lengthy bailout 
agreement contains numerous clauses 
aimed at reducing corruption, the fact 
is that enforcing ever-harsher austerity 
is no way to achieve this.
The Greeks are being punished. 
Timothy Geithner, former US Treasury 
Secretary, was present at the early 
meetings of European finance ministers 
to discuss the Greek situation and is 
very clear as to the mood:
The Europeans came into that 
meeting [in Canada, 2010] basically 
saying: 'We’re going to teach the Greeks 
a lesson. They are really terrible. They 
lied to us. They suck and they were 
profligate and took advantage of the 
whole basic thing and we’re going 
to crush them.' [That] was their basic 
attitude, all of them… They were lied 
to by the Greeks. It was embarrassing 
to them because the Greeks had ended 
up borrowing all this money and they 
were mad and angry and they were like: 
'Definitely get out the bats.' They just 
wanted to take a bat to them. But in 
taking a bat to them, they were feeding 
a fire that was in its early stages. There 
were a lot of dry tinders.5
Given this vengeful reality and the 
fact that the austerity programme was 
both rejected by the Greek population 
in a referendum and rejected as a 
meaningful path to recovery by most 
economists, the question arises as 
to why the Greek Prime Minister 
Tsipras agreed after relatively brief 
negotiations to a package notably 
more severe than the one he had so 
vigorously attacked in the referendum 
campaign. One possible explanation is 
that Tsipras had expected a ‘Yes’ vote 
in the referendum and had already 
decided that such a vote would give 
him leave to accept the moderate 
deal he believed he could negotiate. 
The resounding ‘No’ was probably 
a surprise but was also coupled with 
massive public support for staying in 
the Eurozone and, even more, for 
staying in the EU. Perhaps he had no 
real Plan B. Perhaps he believed that 
Wolfgang Schäuble, the belligerent 
German Finance Minister, had devised 
a plan for a relatively benign exit from 
the euro (Grexit), possibly based on a 
temporary five-year period to allow 
Greece to put its house in order and 
with some support funds and that 
this would be sellable to his electors. 
Perhaps he simply collapsed with sleep 
deprivation at 5.30 am after 17 hours 
of continuous negotiation. 
Certainly, during these negotiations, 
there was to be no moderate Grexit 
plan; this was to be decisively vetoed 
by Chancellor Merkel. Instead there 
was the threat of a totally disorderly 
exit which would plunge Greece 
into even greater crisis. He may have 
been badly advised. There is a strong 
current amongst economists that 
Grexit would, in the end, be the best 
option for Greece. However, the lure 
of the talismanic euro proved too great 
and, in any case, there is no certainty 
that Grexit would allow Greece to 
re-establish the drachma as a sound 
currency.6 The result is that Europe 
now has the worst of all results. The 
Greeks have been publicly humiliated 
and their national sovereignty has been 
thrown to the wind, all for a financial 
plan which has no possible chance 
of success. The basis of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) has been 
undermined, possibly fatally, and the 
European Commission has taken on the 
aura of a supra-national dictatorship. A 
rift has opened up between the two 
major powers in EMU, Germany and 
France, whilst the third big power in the 
EU, the UK, is having that referendum 
which could supply a decisive No vote.
All this means that that future of 
the EMU which has been linked to 
the future of the EU itself is under 
close scrutiny. The logic of a ‘common 
market’ was a ‘common currency’ and 
this view was given some theoretical 
weight by Nobel prize winner Robert 
Mundell in a seminal article in 1962 on 
the theory of optimal currency areas. 
Countries could move to a common 
currency if both capital and labour 
moved freely between the constituent 
countries and wages and prices were 
freely determined across the currency 
area. The most important condition 
was that economic imbalances within 
the region could be resolved by fiscal 
transfers in much the same way as they 
are within countries, with depressed 
areas receiving government aid for 
regeneration. In a currency union 
this would have to be done across 
countries, rather than regions, and 
indeed this was an important reason for 
the increased prosperity of countries 
like Spain and Ireland which had 
benefited from transfers accompanied 
by private investment, at least before 
the banking crisis of the late 2000s.
However, at times of crisis, it 
becomes easy to play the nationalist 
card, blame foreigners for your 
troubles and hark back to the days 
when countries had control over their 
own currencies and borders. Milton 
Friedman observed back in 1997 that:
Europe exemplifies a situation 
The basis of the 
European Monetary 
Union (EMU) has been 
undermined, possibly 
fatally, and the 
European Commission 
has taken on the aura 
of a supra-national 
dictatorship.
EUROPE / GREECE
19V o l u m e  6 7  /  2 0 1 6
unfavourable to a common currency. 
It is composed of separate nations, 
speaking different languages, with 
different customs, and having 
citizens feeling far greater loyalty and 
attachment to their own country than 
to a common market or to the idea of 
Europe.7
Two years later the currency was 
successfully launched and although 
it is not universally popular, there are 
few signs that the majority of people in 
each member country want to leave. 
There are countries that either want 
to or are treaty bound to join when 
their economies are aligned with EU 
members8, and there are countries 
currently outside the euro, such as 
Croatia, a substantial proportion of 
whose domestic transactions are in 
euros.
The EMU originated in the 
Maastricht Treaty which effectively set 
up the European Union as it now exists 
and was signed in 1992. The relevant 
part of the Treaty is that it committed 
member states to following ‘sound’ 
fiscal policies with debt limited to 60% 
of GDP and annual deficits no greater 
than 3% of GDP. These principles were 
enshrined in the Growth and Stability 
Pact (GSP) of 1997 which allowed the 
European Commission to monitor the 
performance of members with respect 
to these criteria and, importantly, 
provided it with powers to intervene 
in a state’s fiscal affairs by declaring 
what was termed an Excess Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) and, ultimately, to 
impose economic sanctions. It did 
not pass unnoticed that the first two 
countries to breach the GSP criteria 
were France and Germany who, 
when the Commission made moves to 
impose an EDP, firmly quashed such 
action.
After the financial crisis of 2008, a 
stricter version of the GSP was agreed 
in 2012, the so-called European 
Fiscal Compact (formally, the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union, or the six-pack as it is 
apparently known to EU insiders after 
its six parts). Only the UK and Czech 
Republic are outside this Treaty which 
imposes the same formal limits on 
budget deficits and debt/GDP ratio as 
Maastricht and introduces various new 
stipulations as to how excessive debt is 
to be reduced. It also requires that the 
Compact be introduced into domestic 
law as a binding constraint on the fiscal 
activity of signatories.
The EFC is extremely complex, 
containing amongst other things 
probably the longest mathematical 
equation ever placed into an 
international treaty. It relates to the 
so-called ‘debt brake rule’ and reads:
bbt = 60%GDP  + 0.95*(bt-1- 
60%GDP)/3 + 0.952(bt-2- 60%GDP)/3 
+ 0.953*(bt-3-60%GDP)/3 
This means, in effect, that members 
should not have a debt to GDP ratio 
exceeding 60%, and if they do, this has 
to be reduced at the rate of 5% a year 
until it reaches that magic threshold. 
Why this should be 60% and not some 
other number is not at all clear and 
may explain why most members of 
the EMU do not comply with it. Even 
Germany which, heroically, managed 
a small surplus in its budget in 2014, 
currently has a debt/GDP ratio of over 
72% whilst France, the second largest 
economy in the group, has a debt ratio 
of over 96% and a budget deficit of 
-3.8%. The average debt/GDP of the 
EU-28 is about 87% whilst the average 
deficit ratio is 2.9%.9
Does this matter? Probably, in 
good times, not a lot. The problem 
is that in times of financial stress, 
attention becomes focused on the 
weakest elements, those countries 
whose debts are perceived as being 
too high. The Eurozone was set up 
in the belief that a common currency 
would create conditions for economic 
convergence amongst its member 
countries. Following Mundell’s seminal 
paper on optimal currency areas, the 
vast economic literature on the subject 
suggests that, however one reads it, the 
Eurozone never satisfied the conditions 
for a successful common currency, 
not least because of the absence of a 
common fiscal regime.
It contains a bloc of northern 
economies which run a large export 
surplus with other states, in particular 
the southern ones. The deficits are not 
necessarily large in relation to GDP 
but they require financing and, in the 
end, require a continual build-up of 
debt. There is no sign that the southern 
economies are converging with the 
northern and there are plenty of signs 
that this imbalance is leading to tensions 
within the EMU and directly within the 
EU itself. The rift noted above between 
France (a deficit country) and Germany 
(the major surplus economy) is one 
obvious sign of this.
The tensions within the Eurozone 
over fiscal policy not only raise 
questions about the future of the euro, 
but further about the future of the EU 
itself. For the original six members 
of the EU’s precursor, the Common 
Market, and for others joining later, 
European union was always a political 
project stemming from Jean Monnet’s 
vision of a united Europe which would 
never repeat the divisions which led 
to the two world wars of the 20th 
Century:
There will be no peace in Europe, if 
the states are reconstituted on the basis 
of national sovereignty... The countries 
of Europe are too small to guarantee 
their peoples the necessary prosperity 
and social development. The European 
states must constitute themselves into a 
federation...10
This conflict between national 
sovereignty and federalism has been 
at the heart of the debate around that 
contentious objective of the Treaty of 
Rome which established the European 
Economic Community, precursor of 
the European Union: ‘the ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe’. 
However, the second part of Milton 
Friedman’s conclusion about Europe, 
The refugee crisis 
has caused a different 
division within the 
EU with Germany 
taking the side of 
the refugees and the 
intransigence this 
time shown by Eastern 
Europe, but with 
southern Europeans, 
especially Greece and 
Italy, carrying the 
refugee burden.
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quoted above, that its citizens’ national 
loyalties are far greater than their 
loyalty to a wider Europe, appears to 
be much nearer the mark. 
So far the UK’s Conservative 
government is the only one in 
the EU committed to hold an in/
out referendum before the end of 
2017. The UK government does not 
actually want to leave the EU, nor 
more significantly, do most of its 
corporate backers, but it needs to 
head off its right-wing and the even 
more right-wing UK Independence 
Party (UKIP), who do want out. This it 
hopes to do by extracting ‘concessions’ 
from the rest of the EU which would 
reshape it more as a customs union 
and restrict other ‘social’ aspects such 
as the free movement of labour and the 
protection of workers’ rights. However, 
polls across Europe in May 2015 found 
that that well over 70% in Poland, 50% 
of those polled in France and Germany 
and just over 50% of those polled in 
the UK were in favour of staying in the 
EU. However, there is an increasing 
minority of citizens in each country 
in favour of leaving, with nationalist 
parties, such as UKIP in the UK and 
the Front National in France, pushing 
for exit – and one recent UK poll even 
suggesting a small majority in favour of 
leaving.
It is unlikely that the EU will agree 
to make the kind of concessions the 
UK seeks, especially the basic principle 
of the free movement of labour – for 
one thing, a fundamental condition, 
of remember, the currency union. In 
spite of this, it is unlikely that the UK 
referendum itself will go that way. 
Probably enough will be made of the 
uncertainties of life after the EU to 
persuade the majority to vote to stay in. 
However should the vote go the other 
way, and the UK exit, it is conceivable 
that right wing nationalist forces in 
other countries would gain momentum 
and force more in-out referenda. 
While attention has focused on 
opposition to EU membership from right 
wing political forces, what of the Left? 
The treatment of Greece, the degree to 
which corporate lobbying is influencing 
EU decision making, especially with 
respect to the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP)11, 
and the treatment of the refugees, is 
increasing left wing opposition to the 
EU. The predominant left view is still 
pro-EU because of the social aspects of 
the union – ‘Social Europe’, although 
left-wing sentiment against ‘Market 
Europe’ is beginning to be more widely 
expressed. The opportunity the EU 
gives for left cooperation across its 
members' borders is obvious, but the 
differences between the old social 
democratic parties with their support 
for austerity and their acceptance of 
the neoliberal view of the world, and 
the new left parties such as Podemos in 
Spain and Syriza in Greece with their 
clear opposition to those policies, will 
make cooperation almost impossible. 
However, in spite of all these differences 
across the political spectrum, we are 
still a long way from EU break-up and 
the return of protectionist trade policies 
and competing national currencies 
which would have serious economic 
consequences on overall welfare. It 
is not clear that most Europeans want 
that.
What implications does a changed 
future for the EU have for other parts 
of the world, and, readers of a Pan-
African journal might well ask, for the 
African continent itself? A break up 
of the EU and Eurozone and a return 
to protectionism would likely reduce, 
or at least slow down the growth of 
European economic activity, although 
this could happen anyway because 
of other developments in the world 
economy, the current slowdown in 
China being one. An EU protectionist 
break up would only make things 
worse.  African economies would be 
worse off through several channels. 
First, the slump in primary product 
prices would be greater and thus affect 
demand for Africa’s leading exports. 
Secondly, demand for migrant labour 
would fall and consequently reduce 
the level of remittances, now the 
second most important transfer of 
income from the developed countries 
to Africa. Such a fall in demand would 
also see migrants returning to their 
countries of origin with the positive 
effects on levels of skill, but negative 
effects of having more mouths to feed. 
Thirdly, there could be a slow-down, 
if not reduction, in foreign investment, 
especially in those activities connected 
with the export trade. This might be 
mitigated by European capital seeking 
new investment opportunities on the 
continent which would serve African 
markets.
The Greek crisis exposed the 
problems of a common currency. 
It exposed the degree to which 
the prevailing orthodoxy, with an 
intransigent Germany in the forefront, 
punished Greece for actions in which 
Germany and others were complicit. It 
fuelled questions about the nature and 
future direction of the EU, including 
its potential break-up, and once again 
questioned the neoliberal paradigm. 
The refugee crisis has caused a different 
division within the EU with Germany 
taking the side of the refugees and 
the intransigence this time shown by 
Eastern Europe, but with southern 
Europeans, especially Greece and Italy, 
carrying the refugee burden. In both 
these cases, the EU showed that for 
many countries in the EU, and certainly 
for their peoples, national sovereignty 
over currencies and borders still 
trumps federal union, which was after 
all the original and, now increasingly 
discarded, long term objective of the 
founders of cooperation in Europe. ■
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